Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Another Step Closer

There was nothing particularly disturbing about the failed launch of the experimental Bulava (SS-NX-30) strategic missile from the Dmitry Donskoi submarine on the evening of September 7. Failures happen, and they are quite useful for identifying problems that should be addressed before the missile is approved for deployment and mass production. Two previous tests, in September 2005 and December 2005, were entirely successful, so from a technical point of view, Yuri Solomonov, head of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering design bureau, should not be that worried. Technicalities regarding the guidance system, however, are of only secondary importance in this project, since the as-yet-non-existent Bulava is already a big political issue (Kommersant; Lenta.ru, September 8).

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly portrayed this missile as tangible proof of the modernization of the Russian armed forces.

[...]

The real problem is that Bulava (which means “mace”) constitutes a central element of a new policy that could be called “virtual deterrence” as it aims at enhancing Russia’s international status mostly by means of PR campaigns and strategic bluff. This policy has a pronounced anti-U.S. character, emphasized by the stream of statements about the uniquely maneuverable warheads that could penetrate any missile-defense system. Simultaneously, Moscow seeks to convince the United States to start a new round of high-profile arms control negotiations. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov tried to sell this idea to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a few weeks ago, and for lack of better arguments dropped a hint that Russia might withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that had marked a breakthrough in Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking back in 1988 (Ezhednevny zhurnal, August 30).

[...]

As far as military matters are concerned, it is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile grand plans such as the recently approved Armaments Program for 2007-2015, estimated at $185 billion, with the fact that the Russian Army is able to buy only 15-30 tanks a year, while India has purchased more than 300 Russian tanks without greatly straining its defense budget (Polit.ru, May 12).

One step closer to the Shanghai Confederation. Empty shell of a Russian military: check!

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